The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 led to a global fi nancial and economic crisis. The resulting lack of available capital, together with the current account imbalances among the eurozone member countries, led to the eurozone sovereign debt crisis in 2009-10. Whereas the German economy emerged from the economic and fi nancial crisis in better shape than most other eurozone countries, the Italian economy is still struggling to recover.
1 Hence, for this paper, Germany is used as a model for considering Italy's policy options. The paper evaluates the economic performance of the German and Italian economies in the context of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) by focusing on their ability to meet the SGP criteria. It argues that in order to reduce its debt-to-GDP ratio, Italy must pursue policies aiming to stimulate growth before undertaking long-term structural reforms. Keynesian economists claim the solution is for the government to use a "fi scal injection" (increase government spending) to hasten recovery. However, many of the reces- eurozone countries in the fi rst half of the 2000s, 9 and both were in violation of the SGP from 2001 to 2005. However, Germany's debt rarely exceeded 60 per cent of GDP before 2008, whereas Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio has exceeded 100 per cent since the early 1990s, and it has never met the 60 per cent debt-to-GDP criterion.
10 Indeed, Italy, alongside Belgium in 1999 and Greece in 2001, succeeded in joining the eurozone on a "fl exible" application of the 60 per cent debt criterion that allowed countries to join as long as they demonstrate suffi cient progress towards meeting the 60 per cent target.
Throughout the fi rst half of the 2000s, both Germany's and Italy's competitiveness declined signifi cantly. For Germany, this was partly due to the lingering costs of unifi cation, but also because it joined the euro at an overvalued exchange rate.
11 For Italy, this was largely because it could no longer rely on devaluation to regain competitiveness losses. German authorities engaged in a series of labour market and other structural reforms, which improved competitiveness and arguably allowed its labour force to remain relatively robust during the economic downturn of 2007-09. On the other hand, no such policies were put in place or at least rendered effective in Italy. Furthermore, Germany is one of the world's largest exporters of vehicles, machinery and chemicals, 12 with a relatively price-inelastic product specialisation. Conversely, in the past decade, Italian exports declined as the country's product specialisation came into direct competition with Asian economies.
13
Major obstacles to growth in both countries during the early 2000s were stagnant domestic demand, structural rigidities and low productivity growth. In Germany stagnation was accompanied by a major rise in unemployment. The extended period of low growth led to structural unemployment in Germany and declining growth for both Germany and Italy. Since the 2008 global fi nancial crisis, both economies have rebounded, although Italy's recovery has been much more modest than Germany's.
Germany and the SGP
Germany is often regarded as a fi scally prudent economy, but it was amongst the fi rst states to be subjected to the EDP after violating the three per cent defi cit-to-GDP threshold. Germany's defi cit exceeded three per cent of GDP In the runup to EMU, many potential risks of monetary union surfaced, such as a member state adopting a loose fi scal policy. 5 With access to a much larger capital market and lower interest rates, governments could potentially engage in reckless borrowing and spending. Such policies could cause two negative externalities. First, moral hazard, if creditor states were forced to tighten their fi scal policies in response to overspending by debtor states. Second, spillover effects, if one state faced a debt crisis.
6 Furthermore, unsustainable sovereign debt risked causing price instability, which could hinder the functioning of the European Central Bank (ECB), whose mandate is to maintain EMU-wide infl ation at a rate below but close to two per cent. 7 A fi scal and a banking union would complete EMU, but a central fi scal authority remains politically elusive, due to state sovereignty and subsidiarity concerns. The SGP was established to prevent these externalities, but it was designed to leave the member states' fi scal autonomy intact: a balance very diffi cult to strike.
Despite implementing different economic policies, the German and Italian economies shared similar patterns following the adoption of the single currency on 1 January 1999. The challenges faced by each country during the EMU sovereign debt crisis were different, but Germany's resilience reinforced its role as a model European economy. Thus, despite the differences between the Italian and German economies, European institutions pointed to the German model when proposing solutions to Italy's debt crisis. This paper provides a comparative analysis of the two economies to assess the effectiveness of such proposals. The comparison is made possible by a number of similarities between the two economies. For example, they rank as the fi rst and third-largest economies in the EMU in terms of GDP. 8 They both maintain large global trading sectors, with a substantial share of intra-EU trade and high volumes of bilateral trade. Each country has great regional disparities: in Germany the former Soviet, eastern part of the country still lags considerably in relation to the western regions of the country, whereas Italy is characterised by an underperforming south. Both experienced the lowest average growth rates of all
